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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
v.
CHARLES ROBERT OTT,

:
:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870225-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for the offense of
theft, a third degree felony, after a tri[al in the Fourth
District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1986).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant waived the issue regarding the

admissibility of the receipt by his failure to object.
2.

Whether the trial court properly found that

defendant did not establish the defense of compulsion.
3.

Whether the trial court correctly found the market

value of the stolen goods to exceed two hundred and fifty
dollars.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Charles Robert Ott, was charged with theft,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-404
(1978).

Defendant was convicted of the charge on April 15, 1987,

after a bench trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable George E.

Balliff Judge, presiding*

Defendant was sentenced to serve a

term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February 1987, defendant, Charles Robert Ott, was
approached by Darin Brailsford and asked if he would participate
in stealing copper wire from the Intermountain Power Project near
Delta, Utah (T. 31-33).*

Brailsford promised defendant that he

would pay defendant $100 for his efforts in the crime (T. 47,
60).

He also told defendant that Garth Bott had threatened him

with serious injury or property damage if he did not pay Bott
$900.00 for some copper wire which he had previously stolen and
which Bott claimed was his stolen booty (T. 41, 43-45, 55, 60).
On the night of February 11, 1987, defendant, Darin
Brailsford, Jeff Ivie, and Charlie Case went to the Power Project
in two separate trucks to steal copper wire (T. 33, 48). Parking
their trucks just outside the Project fence, they climbed the
fence, threw the scrap copper wire over the fence, and loaded a
thousand pounds in each truck (R. 34-35, 49). In a nearby
canyon, they unloaded the trucks and poured gasoline on the wire
to burn off the insulation (R. 35, 50).
On the morning of the 12th, they re-loaded their trucks
with the bare copper wire and drove to Salt Lake City where
Brailsford sold the copper to Wasatch Metal for $844.00 (T. 36,
51).

According to Brailsford, he gave $100.00 to defendant,

$100.00 to Ivie, $100.00 to Case, and kept $100.00 for himself

•T - refers to the Trial Transcript dated April 15, 1987.
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(T. 36, 52) . Upon returning to Provo, Brailsford paid Bott the
remaining $500*00 (T. 36, 52).
On February 18, 1987, defendant and Brailsford returned
to the Power Project to steal more copper wire (T. 38).
According to Brailsford, Bott had made it known that he wanted
the remaining $400.00 (T. 38, 54). This time, defendant and
Brailsford were apprehended by security officers (T. 39).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN[T
Defendant failed to object to the admission of the
receipt on the grounds he now asserts on appeal, therefore, the
issue is waived.

In any event, the receipt would have been

properly admitted as evidence under the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule in light of the testimony and
statements of Jeff Ivie and Darin Brailsford.

Even assuming

admission of the receipt was error, it was harmless error since
the relevant evidence contained in the receipt was also admitted
through the testimony of Darin Brailsford and Von Holtman.
The evidence at trial did not support the defense of
compulsion since the threat was not imminent, defendant failed to
report the threat to the authorities, defendant accepted
compensation for his participation in the criminal acts, and
defendant had lawful alternatives available to avoid the threat.
The prosecution sufficiently established, through
direct and circumstantial evidence, that the market value of the
stolen copper exceeded the $250*00 necessary for third degree
felony theft.

POINT I
DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE RECEIPT AND THUS WAIVED
THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress
the confession of defendant on the grounds that the confession
was obtained by a promise of no prosecution (R. 19-20).

At the

pre-trial hearing on April l f 1987, defendant requested that the
motion to suppress be combined with the trial since defendant had
waived a jury trial (pp.2-3 of the Transcript of Hearing dated
April 1, 1987).

At trial, the State called Mr. Von Holtman,

vice-president of Wasatch Metal and Salvage, who testified as an
expert regarding the market value of scrap copper (T. 19-29).
Mr. Holtman identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as a copy of a
receipt for the purchase of 2,111 pounds of scrap copper from
Darin Brailsford on February 12, 1987 (T. 22-23).

Defendant did

not object to the admission of the exhibit on the grounds that it
was "fruit" of an illegal confession, but rather, he merely
objected to the materiality of the exhibit (T. 24). The court
received the exhibit subject to its materiality being established
at a later time.

Id.

At no time did the State offer or refer to defendant's
confession.

However, the defendant himself testified that he

gave a full confession of the crime including the fact that the
Stolen copper was sold to Wasatch Metal and Salvage (T. 78).
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred
in admitting the receipt since it was tainted evidence obtained
from an inadmissible confession.
merit.
-4-

Defendant's claim is without

It is well established that a defendant waives any
issue regarding the admissibility of evidence if he fails to
state a timely and specific objection.

See Utah R. Evid.

103(a)(1); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 214 (Utah 1983);
State v. Davis. 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984).

In the instant case,

defendant objected only to the materiality of the receipt since
it had a date and value different than alleged in the information
(T. 24-25).

As a result of defendant's f&ilure, the trial court

did not have an opportunity to timely rule on the issue defendant
now asserts.
Admittedly, defendant made a belated attempt to
suppress the receipt at the close of the evidence (T. 86).
However, as noted above, an objection to the admission of
evidence must be timely.

Accordingly, this Court should not

consider defendant's claim of error.
In the event that this Court reaches the merits of
defendant's claim, and assuming the confession was inadmissible,2
the receipt was admissible since its discovery was inevitable.
The United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Wong Sun,
et al. v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) set forth the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine which, in general, excludes
evidence discovered as a result of illegal police action.
However, the Court in Wong Sun acknowledged that there may be

* The record contains no evidence regarding the content of the
confession nor its admissibility.

_c_

exceptions to the general rule of exclusion and noted as follows:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit
of the poisonous tree" simply because it
would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant
objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint." • . .
371 U.S. at 487-88.
Three distinct exceptions to the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine have developed.

Evidence will not be

considered illegal "fruit" when:
(1) the evidence was discovered by an
independant source; (2) the evidence is
sufficiently distant in casual connection
from the illegal search and seizure so that
the connection has become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint; or (3) the evidence
inevitably would have been gained even
without the unlawful search.
United States, ex. rel Owens v. Twomey. 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th
Cir. 1974).

While Twomey specifically refers to search and

seizure, Wong Sun has broader application to all illegally
obtained evidence.
Regarding the third exception, the so called
•inevitable discovery" doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
explains:
If the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would
have been discovered by lawful means . . .
then the deterrence rationale has so little
basis that the evidence should be received. • . .
Njx V, Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984), gert- denied, 471 U.S.
1138 (1985) (footnote omitted).
-6-

In the present case, two of defendant's accomplices,
Brailsford and Ivie, pled guilty to reduced charges in exchange
for their cooperation and testimony (T. 32, 67). Their testimony
and confessions established that about 2,000 pounds of stolen
copper wire was sold to Wasatch Metal and Salvage for $844.00 (T.
36, 49, 65). Clearly, discovery of the receipt was inevitable in
light of the accomplice's testimony and confessions. Therefore,
the trial court did not err in admitting the receipt.
Even assuming the admission of the receipt was error,
it was harmless error.

Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that "[aJny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded.-

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30(a) (1982).

The

Utah Supreme has interpreted this Rule to provide:
that the error is reversible only if a review
of the record persuades the court that
without the error there was "a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant." • . .
Stat? V, Fpntana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984).
In the present case, the receipt added nothing to the
prosecution's evidence which had not already been established
through witness testimony.

The information from the receipt

established; (1) the seller of the stolen copper, (2) the buyer
of the stolen copper, (3) the date of the sale, (4) the quantity
sold, (5) the price per pound, and (6) the total price paid (R.
16) .
In comparison, Brailsford testified that; (1) he was
the seller, (2) Wasatch Metal and Salvage was the buyer, (3) the
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date of the sale was February 12, 1987, (4) the quantity sold was
about 2,000 pounds, and (5) the total price paid was $844.00 (T.
36, 49, 51, 59). The price per pound is determinable by dividing
the quantity sold into the total price.

In addition, Mr. Holtman

testified that the price per pound for insulated copper wire ,
similar to that stolen, would be approximately 30 cents per pound
(T. 28). Thus, the admission of the receipt did not provide any
information that was not already in evidence through witness
testimony.
Notably, defendant volunteered his testimony at trial
that he had confessed to the crime (T. 77-78).

By doing so,

defendant effectively waived his motion to suppress and any
issues arising therefrom.

Under the above circumstances, it is

highly improbable that the result would have been different in
the absence of the admission of the receipt.

Therefore, any

error in the admission of the receipt should be deemed harmless.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT
DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE DEFENSE OF
COMPULSION.
At trial, defendant asserted that he was compelled to
participate in the theft in order to prevent physical harm to his
friend Darin Brailsford (T. 71-73).

He testified that Brailsford

had come to him and explained that Bott was going to kill
Brailsford unless Brailsford paid Bott $900.00. M *

The trial

court rejected defendant's claim as follows:
The Court rejects the defense of
compulsion that has been contended. The
Court does not believe that the defendant did
this act for the predominating purpose of
-8-

trying to save a friend from vicious threats
that had been made against him by another
person as a result of thieving, as he put it,
that was going on.
The story that he tells is hard to
believe. It does not appear to be the kind
of relationship between him and Mr.
Brailsford that would dictate a person
putting himself in jeopardy of violence being
so dramatically opposed to it by his
expressions, just is not believable, and the
evidence is overwhelming that he participated
for criminal intents and purposes. The Court
finds him guilty.
(R. 90-91).
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred
in rejecting defendant's claim of compulsion.

The defense of

compulsion is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1978)
which provides:
A person is not guilty of an offense when he
engaged in to proscribed conduct because he
was coerced to do so by the use or threatened
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon
him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable
firmness in his situation would not have
resisted.
In order to establish the defense of compulsion, three elements
must be proved:

1) the defendant must be faced with an imminent

threat of death or substantial bodily injury, 2) the threat of
substantial bodily injury must be specific, and 3) there must be
no time for complaint to the authorities.
P.2d 630 (Utah 1986).

State v. Tuttle* 730

Defendant's claim must fail for several

reasons.
First, the threat of bodily injury to Mr. Brailsford
was not imminent.

See United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815

(6th Cir. 1982).

According to defendant, Brailsford had "three

days to come up with the money" (T. 83). Clearly, there was
sufficient time to avoid the threat of harm by pursuing lawful
alternatives.
Second, defendant had the opportunity to report the
threat to the authorities but failed to do so. While defendant
claimed that he did make an anonymous inquiry to the police, he
testified that he did not report the details of the threat for
fear of implicating Brailsford in the copper thefts (T. 72, 83).
Defendant's desire to conceal Brailsford's independent criminal
acts cannot justify his failure to report the alleged coercive
threats, and subsequently, the commission of further criminal
acts.

£e£ State v. Patterson, 241 P 977 (Or. 1925).
Third, defendant admitted that he was offered and later

received $100.00 for his participation in the theft (T. 79). He
accepted the $100.00 despite the fact that Brailsford needed to
pay Bott an additional $400.00 to avoid the threatened harm (T.
36-38, 79-80).

Certainly, if defendant's purpose for

participating in the thefts was to avoid harm to Brailsford,
defendant would not have accepted any profits from the criminal
acts until Brailsford had paid Bott in full.

Seq People v.

Tallent, 200 P.2d 214 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
Finally, the substance of the threat did not require
the commission of a separate criminal act in order to avoid the
harm.

The alleged threat was intended to compel Brailsford to

pay money to Bott, not to commit a criminal act.

Lawful

alternatives were available to Brailsford and defendant which
would have effectively avoided the harm.
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For example, defendant

could have helped his friend by raising funds through lawful
wages, a loan, or selling lawfully possessed property such as a
truck.

The evidence is clear that Brailsford was not being

coerced to commit a crime, but simply to pay a debt,

gee Smith

V. State, 703 P.2d 201 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
In light of the compelling evidence, this Court should
find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding
that the evidence did not support the defense of compulsion.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE
VALUE OF THE STOLEN PROPERTY EXCEEDED THE
$250.00 NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THIRD DEGREE
FELONY THEFT.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
establish the property value element of third degree felony
theft.

Theft is classified as a felony of the third degree if:

"The value of the property or services i& more than $250.00 but
not more than $1000.00."
(1978).

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(1)(b)(i)

The Utah Supreme Court established the standard for

determining the value of stolen goods in State v. Carter, 707
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985) which reads as follows:
Where stolen property is not destroyed but
is recovered, it is valued at its fair market
value at the time and place where the alleged
crime was committed. • . •
Id,

The Utah Supreme Court has further defined fair market value

ass
a measure of what the owner could expect to
receive, and the amount a willing buyer would
pay to the true owner for the stolen item. . . •
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977) (footnotes
omitted).
-11-

Defendant claims three things added to the value of the
property:

1) burning off the insulation, 2) labor in burning and

loading the wire, and 3) transporting the wire to Salt Lake City.
Regarding defendant's claim, the trial court found as follows:
THE COURT:

Let's see. If we had the labor
at the minimum wage, what is the
minimum wage?

MR. HARMON:

It's at three twenty-five an
hour •

THE COURT:

You said it took about six hours
to rend the copper down to
eliminate the covering?

MR. HARMON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

So that's about 24 hours all
totalled. That's the only value
added, as I see it, if there's
any merit to your argument. And
if you take maybe a couple of
hundred dollars off of that,
you're still in the felony
range.

MR. HARMON

But we have the value that it
took to load the copper, your
honor.

THE COURT:

Well, I don't think that would
have anything to do with any
value added, because it has not
changed the character of it.
The burning of the insulation
changed the character of it. If
anything made it more valuable
after it left the yard, it was
burning off the coating, not
necessarily the transportation.
Only that act of burning off the
insulation.

And, frankly, I don't buy your
question of value added. I
think, even at the best, it
would not bring it down below a
value of $500.00.
-12-

THE COURT:

Well, in this matter the Court
finds that evidence has been
presented sufficient on the
value to establish that a Third
Degree Felony has been
committed. That the evidence is
overwhelming that Mr. Ott went
there, that he participated in
the entire process of taking and
transporting and rendering the
covering off of the wire and
taking it to Salt Lake City and
selling it, and participating in
the proceeds.

On appeal, this Court's inquiry should focus on whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
finding that the stolen property exceeded $250.00 in value. In
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970), the
Court held that in determining whether the evidence justifies the
verdict, the Supreme Court certifies the evidence and any
reasonable inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict.

The Court further

explained that:
Unless upon our review of the evidence, and
the reasonable inferences fairly to be
deduced therefrom, it appears that there is
no reasonable basis therein for such a
conclusion, we should not overturn the
verdict.
470 P.2d at 247 (footnote omitted).

(Emphasis added.)

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently given great
deference to the rulings of trial courts and the verdicts of
juries.

In the case of State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah
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1976), the Court stated:
This Court has long upheld the standard
that on an appeal from conviction the court
cannot weigh the evidence nor say what
quantum is necessary to establish a fact
beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the
evidence given is substantial. Further, this
court has maintained that its function is not
to determine guilt or innocence, the weight
to give conflicting evidence, credibility of
witnesses, or the weight to be given the
defendant's testimony. . . .
554 P.2d at 218 (footnote omitted).
The Court has further held that, depending on the case,
circumstantial evidence may surpass direct evidence in its effect
on the jury.

State v. Housekeeper. 588 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978).

In

State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964), the Court
held that a jury can find not only facts shown directly by the
evidence, but also such additional facts as may be inferred
therefrom.

The same reasoning applies to the findings of a trial

court.
In the present case, the prosecution established that
the stolen copper was sold in Salt Lake City for $844.00 after
being stripped of its insulation (T. 36). Additionally, Mr.
Holtman testified as an expert that copper wire of the quality
stolen would sell in Salt Lake City for about 30 cents per pound
with the insulation intact (T. 28, 30). At that price, the
stolen insulated copper wire would have been worth $633.30 in
Salt Lake City.
Admittedly, there was no direct testimony regarding the
fair market value of the copper wire at the project site.
However, the testimony established that by transporting the

-14-

copper wire 100 miles north to Salt Lake City, it was worth
$633.30 with the insulation intact (T. 68-69).

Based upon this

evidence, the trial court inferred that in any event, the
insulated copper wire did not have a value of less than $500.00
(T* 69, 90). Such an inference is reasonable for two reasons:
1) the market for metal salvage was in Salt Lake, not the project
site, and 2) the cost of transporting the stolen property from
the project site to Salt Lake via two pickup trucks could not
reasonably have exceeded the difference between $633.00 and
$250.00.

Therefore, this Court should find that there was

sufficient evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, to reasonably find that the value of the stolen
property exceeded the $250.00 element of Third Degree Theft.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendants conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ T

day of April, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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to Milton T. Harmon, attorney for defendant, 36 South Main
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